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The Missing Piece: The Forgotten Role of Testator Intent
in the Application of the Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation in Oklahoma*
I. Introduction
You can’t always get what you want.
You can’t always get what you want.
You can’t always get what you want.
But if you try sometimes, you just might find, you get what you
need.1
As the Rolling Stones so aptly remind us, desires and reality will not always
form a perfect match and intent alone cannot ensure a perfect outcome. This
is particularly true when testators do not follow the necessary rules and their
wills fail. Legal debates between form and function, spirit and letter, and strict
constructionism and interpretivism illustrate this principle at work.2 The law
of decedents’ estates is a ready example. Although the primary purpose of
succession laws is realization of the decedent’s intent,3 statutes intercede to
thwart even the dearest goals of a would-be-testator turned intestate.4
Naturally, the purpose of these statutes, which set forth the requirements for
a valid will, is not to convert the will-writing process into a game of connectthe-dots.5 The statutory requirements are generally straightforward,6 and as
long as the testator is careful, she should succeed in meeting these
requirements. Nonetheless, acts alone do not create a valid will.7 The testator

* I would like to thank Dean Katheleen Guzman for her invaluable suggestions and
guidance throughout the editing process. Additionally, I dedicate this article to my husband,
Eric Swenton, and my parents, Marvin and Nancy Misak, for their unending love, support, and
encouragement.
1. Rolling Stones, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED
(London/Decca Records 1969).
2. See, e.g., Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994).
3. 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.6 (2003)
[hereinafter PAGE].
4. See, e.g., IRVING J. SLOAN, WILLS & TRUSTS 16-30 (1992).
5. See id.
6. For example, a holographic will in Oklahoma has only three requirements. 84 OKLA.
STAT. § 54 (2001). These requirements are that the document be entirely (1) written, (2) signed,
and (3) dated by the testator. Id.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt.
b (1999).
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must intend for the performance of the required acts to create a document that
will have testamentary effect.8 Without both the requisite acts and
testamentary intent, the attempted will fails.9
A valid revocation of a will demands the same “intent plus act” formula.10
Although a testator is free to revoke her will until death,11 the testator must
both fulfill certain statutorily prescribed acts and possess a revocatory intent;
without both, no revocation occurs.12 Only the coupling of intent and
execution of the requisite act leads to a successful revocation.13
Even if the individual’s intent is clear regarding her desire to create or
revoke a will, courts cannot circumvent the statutory requirements to realize
those desires.14 Nevertheless, courts recognize that a formalistic approach can
result in injustice when, despite the clearest evidence of the decedent’s intent,
they are unable to carry out her desires.15 Thus, the judicial system does not
always leave the testator without a remedy.16 A court’s solution, however,
may often only provide the testator with the second best result.
Dependent relative revocation is the doctrine of second best. When a
testator’s own mistakes prevent the probate court from realizing her desired
result, the court might nonetheless be able to offer the testator what she needs.
Judges designed the common law doctrine of dependent relative revocation to
help courts attempt to fulfill a testator’s intent even though the testator failed
to comply with the statutory requirements for revoking a will.17 The doctrine
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 4.1 cmt. h (noting that if a testator abandons the intent to revoke before completing
the requisite act, there is no revocation).
11. Id. § 4.1 cmt. a.
12. Id. § 4.1 cmt. h.
13. Id.
14. See Mann, supra note 2, at 1035-36.
15. Id.
16. George E. Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation and Its Relation to Relief for
Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989, 989 (1971).
17. A “widely accepted and frequently quoted definition” of dependent relative revocation
appears in an A.L.R. annotation. In re Kerckhof’s Estate, 125 P.2d 284, 285 (Wash. 1942).
This definition states that
[w]hen a will, or portions thereof, are canceled or mutilated in order to change the
will in whole or in part, and the attempt fails for want of due authentication, or
other cause, this effort to revoke in whole or in part will be treated as relative and
dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted; and
hence, if the attempted disposition is inoperative, the revocation fails also, and the
original will remains in force.
W.S.R., Annotation, Effect of Testator’s Attempted Physical Alteration of Will After Execution,
62 A.L.R. 1367, 1401 (1929). After considering the A.L.R. definition of dependent relative
revocation, the Washington Supreme Court observed that dependent relative revocation was the

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/7

2006]

NOTES

207

provides a means to diminish the potentially harsh result of enforcing a
testator’s mistaken revocation.18 Under the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation, if a testator based her revocation on a mistake of fact or law, a
court must determine whether the testator would have preferred to lift the
mistaken revocation or allow the property to pass through intestacy.19
The importance of intent, which reigns supreme in all of probate law,20
maintains its hold in the arena of common law dependent relative revocation.21
Thus, a proper application of dependent relative revocation demands an
inquiry into the testator’s intent.22 By requiring the court to determine whether
the testator would have preferred intestacy or removal of the mistaken
revocation, the doctrine ensures that the court considers the testator’s intent.
In title 84, section 103 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the Oklahoma legislature
attempted to codify the common law doctrine of dependent relative
revocation;23 notably absent from this statute, however, is any consideration
of testator intent.24 Oklahoma’s approach to the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation is thus arguably improper. Without examining intent, the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation becomes a formalistic rule in the same vein
as the strict statutory requirements that necessitated its creation. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not faced the issue of whether Oklahoma courts
should consider testator intent despite its conspicuous absence from the text
of the statute. If faced with this issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should
apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation properly by considering the
testator’s intent.

result of the judicial system’s “desire to give effect to the intention of the testator.” Kerckhof’s
Estate, 125 P.2d at 286.
18. Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
19. See In re Callahan’s Estate, 29 N.W.2d 352, 355 (1947).
20. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 807 (1953) (“If possible, a will should be
interpreted according to its terms viewed in the light of the general circumstances surrounding
the testator in order to effectuate his intention.”).
21. See Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
22. See Callahan’s Estate, 29 N.W.2d at 355 (“The doctrine of dependent relative
revocation is based upon the testator’s inferred intention.”).
23. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 103 (2001).
24. Id. Oklahoma’s statute specifies that:
[a] revocation by obliteration on the face of the will may be partial or total,
and is complete if the material part is so obliterated as to show an intention
to revoke; but where, in order to effect a new disposition the testator
attempts to revoke a provision of the will by altering or obliterating it on
the face thereof, such revocation is not valid unless the new disposition is
legally effected.
Id.
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This note argues that Oklahoma must remedy the lack of testator intent
found in title 84, section 103 by demonstrating that without an intent inquiry
the statute creates a hyperformalistic rule that runs contrary to the very purpose
of dependent relative revocation. One can best appreciate the failure of title
84, section 103 to protect testamentary freedom and intent after considering
the pervasive role of intent in all of wills law and in the traditional construction
of dependent relative revocation or, perhaps more appropriately, the
“conditional intent” doctrine.25 Part II explores that role before turning, in Part
III, to precisely why the Oklahoma statute falls short of those goals. Finally,
Part IV provides guidance to the Oklahoma courts and legislature for curing
the omission of testator intent in title 84, section 103.
II. Background
A. Role of Wills in the Distribution of Estates
At death, property may be distributed in one of two ways.26 The state’s
intestacy scheme divides property according to the “inflexible statutory
scheme of inheritance and distribution,”27 where the legislature, not the
decedent, governs the passage of property.28 Although the aim of the
legislature is generally to realize the intent of the decedent,29 the scheme is
fairly inflexible and does not allow for tailoring to meet the specific wishes of
individuals.30 Because a legislative body could never design a statute that
comports with the wishes of every decedent, intestacy schemes only provide
an estimate of the average decedent’s intent.

25. ATKINSON, supra note 20, at 453-54. According to Atkinson’s hornbook, dependent
relative revocation “means, in substance, a conditional revocation.” Id. (reasoning that the
doctrine is in reality conditional revocation because it is a “fictional process which consists of
disregarding revocation brought about by mistake on the feigned ground that the revocation was
conditional”).
26. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.1. One might argue that a third method of distribution exists
in the form of will substitutes, which attempt to employ the benefits of wills while downplaying
the disadvantages. Id. § 6.1. Examples of will substitutes include joint tenancies with right of
survivorship, tenancies by the entireties, and joint bank accounts.
27. Id. § 1.1.
28. Id. In Oklahoma, for instance, the legislature’s intestacy scheme directs that the spouse
will always receive a share of the decedent’s estate, limited only by the existence of a parent,
sibling, or issue of the decedent. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213.
29. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.1 (noting that “the legislatures of every state have established
schemes of succession based upon their assumption as to the natural affections and probable
wishes of the ordinary person, or majority of persons”).
30. Id. For instance, the Oklahoma succession statute makes no allowances for steprelatives or nonfamily friends. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213.
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The second means of distributing property is through a will, which allows
courts to realize a decedent’s exact intent.31 By creating a will, the decedent
decides how the probate court will distribute her property at death.32 If an
individual’s desires form a perfect match with the statute of intestacy, then she
achieves little by creating a will. Nonetheless, property owners often want to
distribute their possessions in a manner that differs from the legislature’s
estimate of testator intent found in the statute of intestacy.33 Individuals may
accomplish this, with some limitation,34 by a will executed in the manner
prescribed by law.
There are many advantages to creating a will as opposed to relying on the
state’s intestacy scheme.35 Individuals primarily write wills to control the
distribution of their property at death.36 A will is especially useful if the
testator’s family members are not equally situated financially and the testator
desires to grant certain members more than others.37 Furthermore,
considerations such as loyalty may lead the testator to feel that certain family
members, or even close friends, deserve a greater portion of the estate.38 This
tailoring of recipients, and the portion received by each, would not be possible
if an individual died intestate. Another benefit flowing from the creation of
a will is the ability to thwart some of the intrafamily arguments that usually
accompany distribution of an estate through intestacy.39 For instance, an estate
will often hold an item of great sentimental value to family members.40 By
granting this item to a particular family member through her will, the decedent
lessens the possibility of an intrafamily squabble over this item. Finally,
monetary considerations, such as estate and inheritance taxes, will likely
influence an individual’s determination of whether to write a will.41
Although there are significant advantages to wills, the ability to create a will
is by no means absolute.42 Most authority “holds that the power to make a will
is in no sense a property right, or a so-called natural or inalienable right which

31. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS § 14 (1916). Generally, a will may
dispose of property in any way that “is not illegal, immoral, or against public policy.” Id.
35. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 1.7.
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no government can impair.”43 Because the right to create a will is statutory,44
rather than constitutional,45 the legislature has the ability to completely revoke
this right, or alter or abridge it as the legislature desires.46
Although the arguments in favor of allowing testation are strong,47 state
legislatures must also consider the benefits of an unalterable statute of
distribution.48 An argument frequently advanced is that property exists for the
living and, therefore, should be subject to only minimal control by the
deceased.49 This argument is commonly referred to as the restriction of “dead
hand” control.50 Taking advantage of the freedom to limit or completely
disallow the right to create a will, many states now deny individuals complex
testamentary freedom by restricting their wills in favor of such persons as
children or spouses.51 Another frequently cited reason for limiting testation is
that by the use of a singular, formalistic approach to the distribution of a
decedent’s property, the judiciary would confront less complex distributions.52
In most instances, without a will to probate, the time and expense associated
with the distribution of a decedent’s estate would decrease, leading to a more
efficient judicial system.53
Despite these arguments in favor of limiting testamentary freedom, every
state provides for the creation of a will.54 The recognition exists that even the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.1.
Id. § 1.7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
For instance, an Oklahoma statute provides that:
[w]hen any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the
issue of any deceased child unless it appears that such omission was intentional,
such child, or the issue of such child, must have the same share in the estate of the
testator, as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided.
84 OKLA. STAT. § 132 (2001). Thus, Oklahoma does not allow for a testator to unintentionally
omit a child; however, a testator may disinherit a child if such intent is clear in the will. On the
other hand, a testator may not “bequeath or devise away from [a spouse] so much of the estate
. . . that the . . . spouse would receive less in value than would be obtained through succession
by law” even when intent to disinherit the spouse is unambiguous. Id. § 44.
52. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.7.
53. See SLOAN, supra note 4, at 10.
54. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-130 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.501 (2002); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2501 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-101 (2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-501 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-250 (West
2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 201 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-102 (LexisNexis 2001);
FLA. STAT. § 732.501 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-10 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-501
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most carefully drafted statute of intestacy could never conform to the desires
of every decedent. By allowing testation,55 states recognize the limits of
intestacy and the important role of testamentary intent. Nonetheless, no state
provides testamentary intent with free rein.56
Every state establishes particular formalities for the creation of a valid will,
and if testators do not meet these requirements, the attempted will fails.57
Perfectly fulfilling every required act, however, is meaningless without testator
intent.58 The testator must intend for the performance of the required acts to
create a testamentary document. Without this testamentary intent, the testator
cannot create a valid will.59
The conditional will exemplifies the importance of testator intent.60 A
conditional will is “one that is to take effect upon the happening or not of some
event.”61 For example, a testator could state in the will that if she does not
return from her camping trip, all her property should go to her best friend. The
(1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-501 (2001); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-1 (2000); IND. CODE
§ 29-1-5-1 (2000); IOWA CODE § 633.264 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-601 (1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 394.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1476 (1991); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-501 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-101 (West 2001);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 1 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2501 (West
1999); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-501 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 474.310 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-521 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2326
(2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 12.133.020 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:1 (1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:3-1 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-501 (West 1994); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 3-1.1 (Gould 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-1 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.108-01 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (West 2000); 84 OKLA. STAT. § 41; OR. REV.
STAT. § 112.225 (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2501 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-2
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-501 (2001); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-102 (2004); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 57 (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-501 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-46 (2003); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.010 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-1 (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
853.01 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-101 (2001). Most states allow wills to take
various forms. Oklahoma, for instance, recognizes three types of wills: nuncupative, selfexecuting, and holographic. 84 OKLA. STAT. §§ 46, 54-55.
55. See supra note 54.
56. For instance, all states require that the individual be of a competent age. See supra note
55. Generally that age is set at eighteen. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.310. Nonetheless, some
states grant testamentary capacity at a younger age. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-10 (granting
every competent individual fourteen years of age or older the authority to make a will).
57. Aside from age requirements, states require that the will take a certain form; usually
this requires that the will be signed by the testator and attested by witnesses. See, e.g., MO.
ANN. STAT. § 474.320.
58. See Palmer, supra note 16, at 989.
59. Id.
60. See THOMPSON, supra note 34, § 26.
61. Id.
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key is to determine whether that language merely recites the inducement for
creating the will or describes a condition that must occur for the will to
function.62 This analysis turns on the testator’s intent.63 If a court finds that
the testator intended for the will to only have effect if she did not return from
the camping trip, it will deem the document a conditional will. Thus, unless
the stated event occurs, the will has no effect.
The conditional will demonstrates the importance of testator intent to the
creation of a valid will. Without performance of the requisite acts, however,
even the clearest intent of the testator cannot save the attempted will.64
Recognizing the harsh results even a small breach may cause if they require
strict compliance with the statutory acts, the more forward thinking
jurisdictions have developed saving doctrines that require less than absolute
conformity with the statutory requirements.65 For example, some jurisdictions
have adopted a substantial compliance doctrine, which allows for the creation
of a valid will with only “substantial compliance” with the required acts.66
Still, to create a valid will, the testator must perform, at least to some extent,
the requisite acts and have the intent to create a document with testamentary
effect.67
If the testator meets both requirements and therefore successfully creates a
will, it is still “not . . . binding and has no legal force or operative effect
until . . . death.”68 Because of this essential concept, the property specified in
the will does not transfer until the death of the testator.69 Thus, a testator may
revoke her will at any point before death.70 Should the testator become
displeased with her will, she may revoke it and create a replacement or simply
die intestate.71 As with the creation of wills, however, intent alone is not
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1
cmt. s (1999).
63. Id.
64. See SLOAN, supra note 4, at 10.
65. See, e.g., 84 OKLA. STAT. 182 (2001). Oklahoma’s substantial compliance doctrine
states that a court may deem the formalities performed when “substantially, though not literally
complied with.” Id.
66. See id.
67. See SLOAN, supra note 4, at 10.
68. 1 PAGE, supra note 3, § 1.2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. h (1999). In Oklahoma, to create an attested will as a replacement the testator must (1)
subscribe the document at the end (or by another in her presence and at her direction), (2)
subscribe in the witnesses’ presence or acknowledge the subscription, (3) declare that the
document is her will, and (4) two witnesses must sign at the end in the testator’s presence. 84
OKLA. STAT. § 55. There are fewer requirements for a holographic replacement will. To create
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enough for revocation.72 The testator must demonstrate her revocatory intent
by performing the requisite acts.73 The methods available to revoke a will vary
by state, but each method requires that the testator meet particular
formalities.74 Only the coupling of intent and execution of the requisite act
leads to a successful revocation.75
Recognizing the importance of fulfilling testator intent, courts generally
dislike striking down a will or attempted revocation for failure to comply with
formalities when the testator’s intent is clear.76 Thus, courts attempt to realize
the decedent’s wishes to the greatest extent possible. When mistakes of the
testator prevent the court from allowing a perfect match between intent and
reality, however, courts will strive for as close of a match as possible.77
B. History of the Common Law Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
The role of a probate court is to carry out the wishes of the testator. One
method devised by the court system to effectuate the wishes of a testator is the
common law doctrine of dependent relative revocation.78 With dependent
relative revocation, even when courts cannot provide the testator with her
truest desires, they may nevertheless avoid the potentially severe results of
failure to comport with formalities by realizing the testator’s second best
choice.79
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is essentially the doctrine of
the Rolling Stones.80 When the court cannot grant the testator exactly what she
wants, it attempts to give the testator the second best result.81 Dependent
relative revocation applies when the testator has revoked the entire will, or a
portion of it, based on a mistaken belief of law or fact.82 If such a mistaken
revocation occurs, the court must then determine whether the testator would

a holographic will, the testator must create a document “entirely written, dated and signed by
the hand of the testator himself” while present in Oklahoma. Id. § 54.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. h.
73. See SLOAN, supra note 4, at 10.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
79. Id.
80. ROLLING STONES, supra note 1 (“You can’t always get what you want. But if you try
sometimes, you just might find, you get what you need.”).
81. Id.
82. Palmer, supra note 16, at 991.
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have preferred to lift the revocation and distribute the property according to the
mistakenly revoked will or allow the property to pass through intestacy.83
Faced with a conditional will,84 a court would likely have no difficulty
finding that the testator’s actions created a conditional revocation. With a
conditional revocation, invalidating the second will means that the testator
never actually revoked the first will.85 The revocation would occur only if the
express condition is fulfilled.86 If the condition is not met, the revocation
never occurred because the testator did not have the requisite revocatory
intent.87
Occasionally, a testator expressly conditions the revocation of a will on the
occurrence of a specified event, in which case no significant difficulty arises
in finding the revocation incomplete.88 The revocation is effective only if the
express condition occurs.89 Much more common, however, is the unexpressed
condition.90 When applying dependent relative revocation, the court gives
effect to the same, albeit unwritten, “conditional intent.” By examining the
testator’s intent, the court must determine whether, although not express, the
revocation was conditional in the mind of the testator on a mistaken belief of
fact or law.91 Thus, dependent relative revocation is not the reinstatement of
a will or clause that has already been revoked, but instead is a determination
that, because of an unmet condition, the testator never revoked the will in the
first place.92 Dependent relative revocation allows courts to correct testators’
mistaken assumptions regarding the revocation of a will or one of its
provisions.93 The doctrine of dependent relative revocation most commonly
applies in three distinct situations.94

83. Id.
84. For an example of a conditional will, consider the circumstance of Mick Jagger. Mick,
having written an initial valid will, writes a second, invalid will. Mick writes on the second
will: “My revocation of Will #1, both through this will as a subsequent instrument, and through
the physical act I am about to commit on Will #1, are both conditioned on my belief that this
second will is valid.”
85. ATKINSON, supra note 20, at 452.
86. Id.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 cmt.
a (1999).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Joseph W. deFuria Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors: The
Argument for Reformation 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1990).
94. Id.
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The first situation in which dependent relative revocation applies occurs
only in antirevival jurisdictions.95 In antirevival jurisdictions, the revocation
of a subsequent will cannot result in the reinstatement of a previous will
despite the testator’s intent to revive the initial will.96 Dependent relative
revocation might apply if a testator executes an initial, valid will but revokes
that will by making a different testamentary disposition through a second,
valid will.97 If the testator thereafter totally revokes the second will, under the
mistaken belief that this will revive the initial will, the testator based the
revocation of her second will on a mistake of law.98 Thus, the court could
employ dependent relative revocation to best effectuate the testator’s intent.
Although the court cannot probate the initial will in an antirevival jurisdiction,
the court can consider whether the testator would have preferred to lift the
mistaken revocation of the second will or allow the property to pass through
intestacy.99
Dependent relative revocation also potentially applies in a second total
revocation situation. Under this scenario, a testator executes an initial, valid
will but then creates a second, invalid will.100 If the testator then revokes the
initial will because of the testator’s belief that the second will is valid, the
revocation is based on a mistaken belief.101 As is the case in dependent
relative revocation circumstances, the court cannot give the testator her best
wish by recognizing the invalid second will.102 Nonetheless, the court can
attempt to fulfill the testator’s second best choice by determining whether she
would have preferred to lift the mistaken revocation of the initial will or to
have the property pass through intestacy.103
Finally, dependent relative revocation also applies in a partial revocation
scenario. In this third situation, the testator executes an initial, valid will;
thereafter, the testator elects to alter a particular clause by marking it out and
inserting an unsigned, undated handwritten notation.104 As with the other two
dependent relative revocation examples, the court must determine whether the
testator would have preferred to have the mistaken revocation of the initial
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Palmer, supra note 16, at 995.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. For example, the testator could revoke a valid clause (“$10,000 to Keith Richards”)
by the physical act of marking through the clause and handwriting above it: “$50,000 to Keith
Richards.”
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clause lifted or to have the property pass through the residuary clause,105 if one
exists, or through intestacy.106
Testator intent permeates the common law version of dependent relative
revocation.107 The common law version of dependent relative revocation was
“based upon the testator’s inferred intention”108 and established to realize this
inferred intent despite the testator’s failure to meet certain formalities.109
When the testator’s own failure to meet the necessary formalities bars the
fulfillment of the testator’s intent, “the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation helps courts to nevertheless give effect to the intent of a testator.”110
Testator intent is therefore a required element of dependent relative revocation
analysis because the court must determine whether the testator would have
preferred to have the initial will admitted to probate rather than having her
property distributed through the laws of intestacy or a residuary clause.111
Without considering testator intent, the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation does not function correctly. As summarized by the Supreme Court
of Georgia, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is “a doctrine of
presumed intention, and has grown up as a result of an effort which courts
always make to arrive at the real intention of the testator.”112
When asked to apply the common law version of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, courts across the United States have recognized the
importance of considering testator intent. For instance, in the case of In re
Olmsted’s Estate,113 a California court held that whether to apply the common
law version of dependent relative revocation should depend primarily on the
presumed intent of the testator.114 The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with
the importance placed on testator intent, stating in McIntyre v. McIntyre115 that
the common law doctrine of dependent relative revocation “has grown up as

105. “Generally speaking, a residuary clause disposes of all the testator’s estate for which
there has not been some previous disposition.” In re Estate of Derifield, 624 N.E.2d 361, 363
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
106. Intestacy is defined as “[t]he state or condition of a person’s having died without a valid
will.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed. 2004).
107. In re Kerckhof’s Estate, 125 P.2d 284, 285-86 (Wash. 1942).
108. In re Callahan’s Estate, 29 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Wis. 1947).
109. Jonathan M. Holda, Recent Decision, 58 MD. L. REV. 841, 844 (1999).
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
111. Id.
112. Carter v. First United Methodist Church of Albany, 271 S.E.2d 493, 496 (Ga. 1980)
(quoting McIntyre v. McIntyre 47 S.E. 501, 503 (Ga. 1904)).
113. 54 P. 745 (Cal. 1898).
114. Id. at 746.
115. 47 S.E. 501.
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a result of an effort which courts always make to arrive at the real intention of
the testator.”116
III. Oklahoma’s Adoption of Dependent Relative Revocation
Oklahoma adopted a statute that replaced the common law version of
dependent relative revocation with an inflexible, legal rule. The state’s earliest
version of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation did not change at
statehood117 and remains unchanged today.118 Oklahoma’s legislature
attempted to codify one aspect of the common law doctrine of dependent
relative revocation in title 84, section 103, which reads as follows:
A revocation by obliteration on the face of the will may be partial
or total, and is complete if the material part is so obliterated as to
show an intention to revoke; but where, in order to effect a new
disposition the testator attempts to revoke a provision of the will by
altering or obliterating it on the face thereof, such revocation is not
valid unless the new disposition is legally effected.119
Title 84, section 103 does not replace the common law version of dependent
relative revocation for circumstances of a mistaken total revocation. Thus, the
common law doctrine of dependent relative revocation still controls the
mistaken revocation of an entire will. The statute only applies when a “testator
attempts to revoke a provision of the will.”120 Therefore, the statute’s key
consequence is the replacement of the common law version of dependent
relative revocation for the partial revocation scenario, in which the testator
revokes only a clause of her will and interlineates an unsigned, undated
change. The statute states that the court should lift the partial revocation
automatically, without considering the testator’s intent.121
Thus, Oklahoma’s statute of dependent relative revocation fails to consider
testator intent,122 the defining characteristic of the common law doctrine of
dependent relative revocation.123 Despite the long history of the statute, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether courts should impute
testator intent into the statute. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
confirmed that the legislature only codified the doctrine as it applies to the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 503 (finding that “[t]he matter finally turns upon the intention of the testator”).
OKLA. COMP. LAWS § 8910 (1909).
84 OKLA. STAT. § 103 (2001).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
See Palmer, supra note 16, at 999.
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revocation of a provision of a will and not where the testator intended to
revoke the entire will.124
Under the common law version of dependent relative revocation, the
testator’s intent controls.125 The Oklahoma Supreme Court established this
approach in Hood v. Ausley (In re Estate of Ausley).126 In Ausley, a testator
attempted to revoke his will by writing “void” across the pages and marking
out the signatures.127 Afterward, he retained an attorney to draft a new will.128
By the time the testator contacted the attorney, however, he was ill and unsure
of the exact testamentary changes he wanted the attorney to make to his will.129
The testator died before the execution of the second will.130 The decedent’s
brother, who the decedent named in the initial will as beneficiary and executor,
submitted the initial will for probate.131 Thereafter, relatives of the decedent
challenged the admission of the will.132
The trial court ruled that the testator had revoked the will submitted for
probate and, therefore, the statute of intestacy governed.133 The appellate court
reversed, determining that title 84, section 103 controlled, and, thus, the
effectiveness of revocation was conditional on execution of a new will.134
“[B]ecause the new deposition was not legally effected,” the revocation was
inoperative.135
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,136 finding that
the court of appeals “indicated a belief the second clause of [title 84, section]
103 was a codification of the common law doctrine of dependent relative
revocation,” and that “[t]his is only partly correct.”137 The court explained that
title 84, section 103 only applies when the testator revokes a provision of a
will, not when the testator revokes the entire will.138 Because the common law
approach to dependent relative revocation applied to both partial and total
124. Hood v. Ausley (In re Estate of Ausley), 1991 OK 105, ¶ 22, 818 P.2d 1226, 1231.
125. Id. ¶ 26, 818 P.2d at 1232; Estate of DeWald v. Whittenburg, 1996 OK CIV APP 114,
¶ 2, 925 P.2d 903, 904.
126. Ausley, 1991 OK 105, 818 P.2d 1226. Ausley is the most recent Oklahoma Supreme
Court discussion of title 84, section 103.
127. Id. ¶ 25, 818 P.2d at 1232.
128. Id. ¶ 20, 818 P.2d at 1230.
129. Id. ¶ 19, 818 P.2d at 1230.
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶ 22, 818 P.2d at 1231.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 1, 818 P.2d at 1227.
134. Id. ¶ 2, 818 P.2d at 1227.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 30, 818 P.2d at 1233.
137. Id. ¶ 22, 818 P.2d at 1231.
138. Id.
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revocation, the court stated that the common law version of the doctrine should
continue to apply to total revocation.139
After determining that the common law version of dependent relative
revocation should control, the court was then free to consider the critical
element of testator intent.140 The court relied upon presumed testator intent to
determine whether the estate should pass according to the previous will or the
statute of intestacy.141 After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
because “the evidence as to the probable intent of decedent as to whether the
revocation was intended to be complete and absolute [was] conflicting,”142 the
trial court’s decision not to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
was not “against the weight of the evidence.”143 The court determined that the
testator did not condition the revocation of the initial will on the execution of
a second will.144 Therefore, the Supreme Court reinstated the initial decision
of the trial court.145
In 1996, five years after the Ausley decision, the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals reaffirmed the importance of testator intent under the common law
doctrine of dependent relative revocation. In Estate of DeWald v.
Whittenburg,146 the testator completely revoked his first will and executed a
second will.147 Nine years after executing the second will, the testator named
his friend as the primary beneficiary and executor of the will by
interlineations, replacing the previous beneficiary and executor.148 After the
previous beneficiary contested the second will,149 the trial court declared it
invalid.150 Upon review, the court of appeals held that because the testator
totally revoked, rather than partially revoked, the first will, title 84, section 103
did not control.151 Again the Oklahoma courts recognized that title 84, section
103 only applies to partial revocations.152
Given that the testator totally revoked his first will, the DeWald court
determined that the common law approach to the doctrine of dependent
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. ¶ 22, 818 P.2d at 1231-32.
Id. ¶ 23, 818 P.2d at 1232.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28, 818 P.2d at 1233.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 818 P.2d at 1233.
Id. ¶ 30, 818 P.2d at 1233.
1996 OK CIV APP 114, 925 P.2d 903.
Id. ¶ 2, 925 P.2d at 904.
Id. ¶ 4, 925 P.2d at 904.
Id. ¶ 5, 925 P.2d at 904.
Id. ¶ 6, 925 P.2d at 904.
Id. ¶ 16, 925 P.2d at 906.
Id.
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relative revocation controlled.153 The appellate court recognized the
importance of considering the testator’s intent for a proper dependent relative
revocation analysis by stating, “[w]hether a will revocation should be negated
under the doctrine is a question of fact, and if the doctrine is so applied, it will
not be done arbitrarily, but only after a review of the record to determine the
intention of the testator.”154 Examining the record, the court found substantial
evidence that rebutted any presumption that the decedent would have preferred
that the recipient under the first will take the entire estate rather than have the
estate distributed through intestacy.155 Therefore, the court of appeals held,
after considering the intent of the testator, that the testator would rather have
died intestate than have the first will control.156
IV. Potential Problems Resulting from Title 84, Section 103 and Suggested
Solutions
A. Problems Arising from Section 103
The Oklahoma legislature’s replacement of the common law approach to
dependent relative revocation with a rigid, formalistic rule causes significant
problems. Oklahoma’s approach to dependent relative revocation, codified in
title 84, section 103, devalues testator intent, stands in contrast to other
Oklahoma statutes, and institutes an unnecessarily formalistic approach to
dependent relative revocation analysis.
The most significant problem with title 84, section 103 is the absence of
testator intent. Failure to consider the intent of the testator runs contrary to the
main goal of probate courts — realization of testator intent157 — and leads to
an inappropriate dependent relative revocation analysis. Without an inquiry
into the testator’s intent, courts cannot correctly apply dependent relative
revocation. A correct application of dependent relative revocation requires the
court to first determine whether a mistaken revocation occurred.158 If such a
mistaken revocation occurred, the court must then determine whether to apply
dependent relative revocation and lift the mistaken revocation.159 To make this
decision, the court determines whether the testator would have preferred to lift
the mistaken revocation or to have the property pass through intestacy.160
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 925 P.2d at 906.
Id. ¶ 20, 925 P.2d at 906.
Id.
See Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Without an intent inquiry, title 84, section 103 does not represent a true
dependent relative revocation analysis because the pivotal decision of what the
testator would have preferred — removal of the mistaken revocation or
intestacy — is absent. Thus, by enacting title 84, section 103, the Oklahoma
legislature has directed the court to use an incomplete and incorrect approach
to dependent relative revocation.
The overriding principle of probate courts is to give effect to the testator’s
intent.161 There are numerous policy reasons behind effectuating testamentary
intent to the greatest extent possible.162 For example, ignoring the testator’s
intent during probate greatly reduces the benefits of electing to execute a will
rather than allowing the estate to pass through intestate succession. If the
decedent had wanted the intestacy scheme to control the distribution of her
property, she would not have wasted the time and expense associated with
creating a will.163 Given the burdens associated with creating a will, the
majority of testators most likely execute a will because the controlling
intestacy statutes do not result in their desired distribution of property. If the
court system frequently ignores the testator’s intent, the public will doubt that
any real benefit exists in creating a will because the court system allows
formalistic rules to thwart a testator’s intent, even when that intent is clear.
The ability to control the distribution of one’s property, and all the associated
benefits, is the most obvious benefit of creating a will. If courts do not
recognize a testator’s clear intent whenever possible, the public will lose the
strongest motivator for will creation.
Title 84, section 103’s lack of testator intent not only conflicts with the
overarching purpose of wills law in general, it also conflicts with other
Oklahoma statutes and case law. For example, one Oklahoma statute
specifically recognizes the importance of testator intent.164 In title 84, section
151 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the legislature specifically directs probate
courts to effectuate the intent of the testator whenever possible.165 This section
states that “[a] will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator.
Where [a testator’s] intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have

161. Id.
162. Id. at 990-91.
163. See Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 599 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
individuals may be forced into the time and expense of drafting a will if they are not content
with the intestacy scheme’s nonrecognition of stepchildren as heirs); see also MARVIN B.
SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 205 (1970) (finding that a significant number
of individuals engage in the time and expense of writing a will because they are not satisfied
with the intestacy scheme).
164. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (2001).
165. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

222

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:205

effect as far as possible.”166 The legislature further emphasized that courts
should effectuate testator intent by describing what courts may consider when
attempting to ascertain the testator’s intent.167 In cases of uncertainty, the court
should determine testator intent “from the words of the will, taking into view
the circumstances under which it was made, exclusive of the testator’s oral
declarations.”168 Therefore, the Oklahoma legislature itself has recognized the
importance of testator intent and has expressly held that courts should respect
such intent whenever possible.
Oklahoma case law also recognizes the importance of testator intent. As
previously discussed, in both Ausley and DeWald, Oklahoma courts clearly
acknowledged the importance of testator intent in the context of dependent
relative revocation.169 Oklahoma courts, however, also recognize the
importance of testator intent as an overarching principle of probate law. In In
re Estate of Worsham,170 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals noted that
testamentary intent is the guiding principle for a probate court.171 Thus, a
court’s failure to consider testator intent stands in stark contrast to the guiding
principle of testator intent for succession of property in Oklahoma, according
to both statute and case law.
Title 84, section 103 replaced the common law doctrine of dependent
relative revocation with an unnecessarily harsh, formalistic rule. Although
potential benefits from the use of formalistic rules exist, these benefits do not
outweigh the burdens, especially in the context of wills law. Some supporters
argue that using formalistic rules advances the goal of judicial efficiency172
because using formal, statutory requirements for creation of a valid will assists
the judiciary by channeling the “vast array of testamentary things . . . into a
form that is readily recognizable as a will.”173 When the judiciary demands
strict compliance with the statutory rules, however, the principle of freedom
of testation is lost, and the replacement is “harsh and relentless formalism.”174

166. Id.
167. Id. § 152.
168. Id.
169. See Hood v. Ausley (In re Estate of Ausley), 1991 OK 105, ¶ 26, 818 P.2d 1226, 1232;
Estate of DeWald v. Whittenburg, 1996 OK CIV APP 114, ¶ 14, 925 P.2d 903, 906.
170. 1993 OK CIV APP 122, 859 P.2d 1134.
171. Id. ¶ 7, 859 P.2d at 1136 (finding that “[i]n interpreting a will the intention of the
testator is paramount”).
172. Mann, supra note 2, at 1036.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1037 (quoting John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975)).
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Dependent relative revocation developed as a means of realizing the
testator’s intent despite an absence of formalities.175 When states demand strict
compliance with statutory formalities to create a valid will, courts are unable
to realize the testator’s intent even when they ruefully acknowledge the
existence of the clearest evidence of the testator’s true intent.176 Thus,
dependent relative revocation allowed the courts to offer the testator her
second best option when her truest desires were thwarted by unmet statutory
requirements.177 By replacing the common law version of dependent relative
revocation with a formalistic rule in which the partial revocation is always
lifted, Oklahoma has turned the solution for strict, formalistic rules into a
strict, formalistic rule itself. Thus, although Oklahoma’s formalistic rule that
a testator’s attempted partial revocation is never valid unless its replacement
is legally effective allows for a faster and cheaper probate, the high cost of
incorrect dependent relative revocation analysis and loss of consideration of
testator intent is unacceptable.
B. Suggestions for the Oklahoma Judiciary
Even though Oklahoma’s dependent relative revocation statute178 fails to
consider testator intent, the court system must consider intent or the
application of the doctrine will become a hyperformalistic rule that is of no
more benefit to the testator than the rules that necessitated its creation. In both
Ausley and DeWald, Oklahoma courts recognized that testator intent is an
indispensable element of the common law doctrine of dependent relative
revocation.179 The courts’ continued application of the common law version
of dependent relative revocation for total revocation, rather than adopting the
approach in title 84, section 103, indicates that Oklahoma courts recognize the
difficulties that can arise from failing to consider the testator’s intent.
The Oklahoma judiciary therefore faces the difficult task of adhering to the
statute while maintaining fidelity to the main function of a probate court. A
probate court should always attempt to fulfill the testator’s intentions, and a
proper dependent relative revocation analysis would consider testator intent.180
Nonetheless, the Oklahoma court system should respect the obvious preference
of the legislature for lifting a partial revocation without considering testator
175. See, e.g., L.S. Tellier, Effect of Testator’s Attempted Physical Alteration of Will After
Execution, 24 A.L.R.2d § 4 (Supp. 1996).
176. Mann, supra note 2, at 1036.
177. Palmer, supra note 16, at 989-91.
178. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 103 (2001).
179. Hood v. Ausley (In re Estate of Ausley), 1991 OK 105, ¶ 26, 818 P.2d 1226, 1232;
Estate of DeWald v. Whittenburg, 1996 OK CIV APP 114, ¶ 14, 925 P.2d 903, 906.
180. See Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
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intent.181 Thus, Oklahoma courts must strike a balance between these two
competing interests.
The best resolution to this tension rests in adopting a presumption that
courts should lift a mistaken partial revocation. By starting with the
presumption that they should lift the revocation, courts would comport with
the obvious preference of the statute. The presumption would not, however,
foreclose the consideration of testator intent; therefore, a proper dependent
relative revocation analysis, including a determination of testator preference,
would still be possible.
The approach that a partial revocation is only presumptively ineffective, not
automatically ineffective, follows the approach recommended by the American
Law Institute (ALI).182 As stated by ALI, the use of a presumption preserves
the important element of testator intent and the revocation will stand despite
the presumption if “the outcome of allowing the revocation to remain in effect
comes closer to the testator’s failed dispositive objective.”183 Under this
approach, the Oklahoma courts would presume that the mistaken revocation
should be lifted. The presumption could be rebutted by a demonstration that
allowing the revocation to stand was more in line with the testator’s intent.184
Thus, the use of a presumption in favor of lifting the revocation strikes the
necessary balance between the Oklahoma statute and the role of a probate
court.
C. Suggestions for the Oklahoma Legislature
Alternatively, the Oklahoma legislature could rewrite the statute to
represent a true version of dependent relative revocation. Ideally, the statute
would set forth the common law approach, in which testator intent is the
determining factor for whether courts apply dependent relative revocation to
lift a mistaken revocation.185 Such a statute would require the courts to
consider two distinct elements. First, the court would determine whether the
testator based her revocation on a mistake of fact or law.186 If so, the courts
would then ask whether the testator would have preferred for the revocation
to stand and, thus, have the property pass through the residuary clause, if one

181.
182.
(1999).
183.
184.
185.
186.

84 OKLA. STAT. § 103.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3
Id. § 4.3 cmt. a.
Id. § 4.3.
See Palmer, supra note 16, at 989-90.
Id.
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exists, or intestacy, or whether the testator would have preferred to lift the
mistaken revocation.187
If the legislature believes that a presumption for or against the application
of dependent relative revocation is necessary for smooth probate procedures,
then the Oklahoma legislature could model the statute after the example
provided by the ALI.188 If the legislature rewrites the statute to include a
presumption that the revocation should be lifted, the legislature will be able to
state its preference for the application of dependent relative revocation.
Nonetheless, the legislature should write the statute so a complete bar would
not exist to consideration of testator intent. The legislature should explicitly
state that the presumption is rebuttable upon a demonstration that allowing the
revocation to stand more closely reflects the testator’s intent than lifting the
mistaken revocation.189 This approach allows for the legislature to set forth its
preference. By allowing testator intent to function as the only trump on the
presumption in favor of lifting the mistaken revocation, a proper dependent
relative revocation analysis would still be possible.
Furthermore, the legislature should eliminate the distinction between partial
and total revocation that currently exists in the statute.190 A correct dependent
relative revocation approach applies equally to both partial and total mistaken
revocations.191 Fortunately, the present version of title 84, section 103 does
not thwart a correct dependent relative revocation analysis for a total
revocation.192 Nonetheless, if the legislature revises the statute to represent a
proper approach, the distinction will be unwarranted and unnecessary.
V. Conclusion
As the Rolling Stones warn,193 desires and realities do not always match.
Unfortunately, Oklahoma’s dependent relative revocation statute only
exaggerates the disparity. Oklahoma’s statute has converted the intent-based
doctrine of dependent relative revocation into the type of hyperformalistic
doctrine it was designed to remedy. As it stands now, this statute works as a
formalistic rule that prevents an appropriate dependent relative revocation
analysis. Thus, the Oklahoma legislature should reform title 84, section 103.
The Oklahoma judiciary should continue to approach dependent relative

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3.
See id.
See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 103 (2001).
See Palmer, supra note 16, at 990.
84 OKLA. STAT. § 103.
ROLLING STONES, supra note 1.
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revocation analysis properly by considering testator intent until the Oklahoma
legislature redrafts the statute to comport with other areas of wills law and the
common law approach to dependent relative revocation. In this way,
dependent relative revocation can continue to help those testators who “can’t
always get what [they] want” to nonetheless “get what [they] need.”194
Julia E. Swenton

194. Id.
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